In this paper, an argument from Gauker against the so-called expressive theory of communication is reviewed and rejected. In particular, a case of miscommunication which Gauker thought to be problematic for the expressive theory is analysed in terms of what Gauker called the 'neutral perspective' on miscommunication, a perspective which is shown to accord well with recent semantic theories of underspecified meaning as well as with the expressive theory.
available aspects of the utterance situation.)
We will refer to this example as the T&S example. Gauker has used this example in many of his publications aimed at the expressive theory of communication. In his recent contribution to Mind, Gauker has argued that there are basically only three possible perspectives on the T&S example, each of which "faces some difficult questions" if the expressive theory is assumed to be true. Here are the three perspectives. T stands for Tommy's utterance:
(a) T is false (Suzy is right); or (b) T is true (Tommy is right); or (c) A neutral perspective.
Gauker distinguishes two neutral perspectives, but we will restrict attention to one of them, according to which T is both true (with respect to Tommy's interpretation) and false (with respect to Suzy's interpretation). 3 Since there are problems with each of the three perspectives, Gauker concludes that "the fault lies with the expressive theory of communication" (p.30).
The first perspective (a) is rejected by Gauker. 4 His argumentation, as I understand it, is that the expressive theory's emphasis on the intention of the speaker forbids identifying meaning with what the hearer has in mind, unless it happens to coincide with what the speaker has in mind. 5 This position seems reasonable enough and we will refrain from discussing it here.
Given Gauker's rejection of the first perspective, one might expect him to embrace the second perspective (b): An utterance may have various legitimate interpretations, but one might argue that it is always the task of the hearer to retrieve the one interpretation that was intended by the speaker. In a previous paper, Gauker has contended that this perspective is the correct one from the point of view of the expressive theory (Gauker 1992) . Remarkably, however, this position is abandoned in the present paper. Here he notes that "(...) the straight defense of Tommy is not entirely persuasive (...)" p.22. The reasons for Gauker's change of opinion are interesting but they need not occupy us here.
Gauker devotes much space to a discussion of the third perspective (c), and this is the part of his paper on which we will be focusing. Gauker rejects the neutral perspective and in his recent paper, he argues that if one believes the expressive theory, then the neutral perspective makes it difficult to "understand the verbal process by which interlocutors resolve their conflicts (...)" (p.30). He writes opposite ends of a long-distance telephone line, as a result of which their respective external contexts are different. For reasons of exposition, however, we will stick to the version used by Gauker.
him, it creates exactly analogous problems for the expressive theory as the other ('multiple truth values') variety of the neutral perspective. We will refrain from further discussion of the 'no truth value' perspective since I believe that the 'multiple truth values' perspective is basically correct. (See sections 2 and 3 for elaboration.) 4 Recall that we are assuming that Tommy's and Suzy's interpretation are equally plausible, and that the only relevant difference between them is that one represents the view of the speaker while the other represents that of the hearer. 5 "(...) the hearer's point of view cannot be constitutive because the hearer's objective ought to be to identify the proposition that the speaker intends the hearer to recognize as the proposition toward which the speaker intends the hearer to take a certain attitude on the basis of his or her choice of words and the context" Gauker (1997), p.23. If in interpreting Tommy's utterance we suppose that there are really two domains, such that relative to the one Tommy's utterance expresses a true proposition and relative to the other it expresses a false proposition, then likewise we might say that relative to the first domain Suzy's declaration expresses a false proposition and relatively to the second a true one. (Gauker 1997, p.28) According to Gauker, this is problematic because it would imply that "there is no unique proposition that her words express". (p.28). It may not be immediately obvious why this is a problem. If 'not expressing a unique proposition' is problematic, then why is Suzy's utterance more problematic than Tommy's, one might ask. But let us try to sort out what Gauker is saying.
As I understand him, Gauker is pointing at two problems here: a semantic and a pragmatic one. If there is nothing (i.e., no single 'object') of which we can say that it is the meaning of Tommy's T, then how can we define the meaning of Suzy's 'T is false', in which T is embedded? This may appear especially mysterious from the point of view of the expressive theory since it may be taken to follow from this theory that an utterance has only one meaning, namely the proposition the speaker intended to convey by it. This is the problem of how to provide a compositional semantics to certain composite sentences (exemplified by Suzy's utterance (Gauker 1997, p.27.) Thus, Gauker formulates a double challenge to the expressive theory: to come up with a formalization of the neutral perspective that makes possible a proper ('compositional') analysis of such sentences as 'T is false' and to explain, making use of the neutral perspective, how conflicts of the T&S type can be resolved. Both of Gauker's challenges can be met, as will be show presently. Firstly, a version of the neutral perspective will be sketched that relates the utterances of Tommy and Suzy in a precise way that is compatible with the expressive theory of communication. This will answer Gauker's semantic challenge. Subsequently, his pragmatic challenge will be shown to pose no particular problems of a theoretical kind, but only questions of an empirical nature.
The semantics of ambiguous utterances
Gauker's discussion has focused fully on ambiguities involving the notion of Domains of Discourse. It is true that this is an intriguing and important notion. Recent work in formal semantics suggests that all major types of noun phrases can be dependent for their interpretations on contextually determined domains. To take an especially common type of example, consider the word 'paper', as in John has written five papers on Plato, where 'paper' can be understood in a number of different senses. In one sense of the word, for example, it signifies only articles in scientific journals, while in another sense it signifies a much broader class of documents. The proposition conveyed by this sentence depends on the intended interpretation of 'paper' and this indeterminacy will tend to remain unresolved in many utterance situations. Yet, the speaker may have one of the two interpretations in mind, to the exclusion of the other. Making use of such indeterminacies, it is easy to construct extremely plausible thought experiments of the T&S type in which domains of discourse nevertheless do not play a role.
Since the problem of domains of discourse is a special case of the problem of ambiguity, it is natural to make use of the formal equipment that has been developed for the analysis of ambiguity. Most notably, recent years have seen the emergence of ambiguous, or underspecified logical languages. Such languages are now almost routinely used for the representation of linguistic information in Natural Language Understanding systems, and their properties are investigated intensively (e.g. Hobbs 1985 , Alshawi 1990 , Poesio 1994 , Reyle 1995 , Van Deemter and Peters 1996 . Expressions in these languages are similar to expressions in other logics, but they are designed to contain one or more of the (lexical, scopal, contextual, etc.) kinds of ambiguities that natural languages also display, which makes them suitable to serve as the direct logical "translations" of ambiguous expressions in natural languages. An important advantage of this approach is that it allows certain important types of information processing (such as logical inference) to be performed before all ambiguities are resolved. 6 An early example is Sidner (1987) . Later work includes Partee (1989) and Van der Sandt (1992) , for example.
7 The 'Domain of Discourse' D, which is a mere technical device, should not be confused with the empirically motivated 'Domain of Discourse' that features in the title of this paper, and which has a purely empirical origin.
Much can be said about the formal requirements to be made on an interpretive mode. What matters here is that the way in which a person interprets utterances, at a given point in time, can be represented as such an interpretive mode. 8 Given the apparatus of underspecified predicate logic, it is not difficult to model the miscommunication between two interlocutors who have different interpretations of the word 'paper' in mind. The sentence John has written five papers on Plato is translated into a formula of underspecified predicate logic containing an ambiguous predicate, say P, for the word 'paper'. This formula is true or false, given an interpretive mode, depending on how that mode interprets P. Hearer and speaker interpretation of the example sentence can be defined on the basis of interpretive modes without difficulty.
The simplest way of applying the notion of an interpretive mode to the T&S example is by treating contextual ambiguity as a special case of lexical ambiguity. This can be done using an ambiguous constant DoD (as short for 'Domain of Discourse') which can mean different things: the domain Tommy has in mind (DoD t ) or the domain Suzy has in mind (DoD s ). Using this ambiguous constant, T can be represented as follows:
Depending on whether one uses Tommy's mode (m t ) or Suzy's (m s ), this formula will take on different meanings. Let us assume that the classical interpretation I attributes different subsets of the domain D to the nonambiguous constants DoD s and DoD t and that = is a complete interpretation which extends I with the interpretation of the ambiguous constant DoD. Let us use the following abbreviations:
Tommy's mode m t 'causes' him to interpret T as the proposition T t ; Suzy's mode m s 'causes' her to interpret T as the proposition T s . But since DoD t and DoD s denote different domains, T s and T t express different propositions, resulting in a mismatch between the interpretations of the speaker and the hearer. To make things worse, the two propositions have different truth values: T t is true, but T s is false. Consequently, the underspecified formula T is true with respect to m t and false with respect to m s . Suzy's retort, which we will abbreviate as S, can be analysed along exactly similar lines. The representation for S can be rendered simply as :T, which expresses the contradictory of the proposition expressed by T. Thus, S is true with respect to a given mode of interpretation if and only if T is false with respect to that mode, and S is false otherwise. Focusing on the interpretations of the speaker and the hearer, the situation can be schematized as follows:
T S m t T t :T t m s T s :T s
This simple schema brings out clearly that, on each of the two modes (m s or m t ), the interpretation of S is a function of the interpretation of T. It shows that both T and S are 8 It can be argued that something more abstract than an interpretive mode is needed to model how a person interprets utterances, since a mode determines the exact extension that a constant happens to have in a particular world. A more abstract notion, which can be viewed as a mapping from ambiguous to nonambiguous expressions, is provided in Van Deemter (1996) . For current purposes, the notion of an interpretive mode will be adequate.
associated with different propositions, depending on the interpretation involved, but that this does not preclude us from giving a compositional analysis.
The extension of predicate logic outlined very sketchily in the present section offers a direct formalization of what Gauker calls a neutral perspective on the T&S example, since it replaces truth simpliciter by two different notions of truth, one of which depends on the speaker and the other on the hearer. In the following section it will be argued that nothing in this semantics contradicts the expressive theory of communication and it will be shown how the resolution of the conflict between Tommy and Suzy can be modeled using the same perspective.
The Expressive Theory of Communication
Having sketched a compositional account of how Tommy and Suzy view the meanings of their respective utterances, we need to investigate how this account can be embedded in a theory of communication that allows us to make sense of the interaction between Tommy and Suzy, and whether this can be done in such a way that the expressive theory of communication is not contradicted. In what follows, such an embedding will be sketched.
Recall that the expressive theory is defined by Gauker as "(...) any conception of language according to which the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey propositions to hearers" (Gauker 1997, p.5) . Of course, this is hardly a theory of communication. In particular, it says nothing about how language is related to propositions and about what it means to convey a proposition. Therefore, it is quite easy to define the key notion of the expressive theory, to 'convey' a proposition in terms of the perspective on meaning outlined in the previous section, and the same is true for the twin notions of 'successful' and 'unsuccessful communication' that are crucial to our understanding of verbal conflicts. Moreover, this can be done in such a way that it captures much of our intuitive understanding of what goes on in cases of verbal conflict, such as the T&S example. All of this can be done without contradicting the expressive theory.
Let us write m(U) as a shorthand for the proposition expressed by the utterance U under the interpretive mode m. Furthermore, let us write m to denote the mode associated with a person at a given point in time. The notion that there usually is one unique such mode, a possibly different one for each interlocutor, formalizes what could be termed the 'principle of idiosyncratic interpretation', which is vital to the understanding of how ambiguous expressions are interpreted: interlocutors can attribute different interpretations to a given ambiguous utterance and they may even be unaware that the utterance is ambiguous. Making use of this notation, we can use the following definition of what it means to 'convey' a proposition:
A speaker conveys a proposition p to a hearer iff utters U, hears U, and m (U) = p. To avoid miscommunications, speakers tend to utter 'safe' utterances: utterances that mean the same for the hearer and the speaker. Based on his or her knowledge of the context and the person of the hearer, a speaker has incomplete (and possibly incorrect) information concerning the interpretive mode used by the hearer. Suppose, for example, the speaker (i.e., ) does not know what exact mode is used by the hearer but he does believe it is one of the modes in the set, say, M. Then if he wants to convey the proposition p, he will typically try to make an utterance U that means p on any of the modes in M, as well as on his own; in other words, an utterance U for which it holds, for all m"M, that m(U) = p, while also m (U) = p. But cases can arise where the speaker is misinformed about the context of the hearer, or where he simply fails to realize that the utterance allows a different interpretation than his own. In such cases, misunderstandings are likely to occur.
We have sketched a little theory of communication which makes use of the quasi-formal terminology of section 2 and in which the expressive theory lies embedded. After all, under our understanding of what it means to 'convey' a proposition, it is quite plausible that 'it is the primary function of language to enable speakers to convey propositions to hearers'. Let us apply our little theory of communication to the case of Tommy and Suzy. Tommy utters a sentence, All of the red ones are mine. To him this means All the red marbles in Tommy's room belong to Tommy. Now he fails to take Suzy's context into account and he mistakenly believes that her interpretive mode will 'cause' this sentence to be interpreted in the same way. In fact, however, Suzy's interpretive mode is such that it 'causes' her to interpret Tommy's utterance as saying that All the red marbles in Suzy's room belong to Tommy. As a result, this second proposition is the one that his utterance conveys, although he intended to convey the first one. Less problematic cases, such as the one where hearer and speaker share the same interpretation (whether or not the utterance is ambiguous) are also modeled quite easily.
At this point we have shown that the neutral perspective on the T&S conflict given in the previous section is consistent with the expressive theory of communication. So how about the second, pragmatic part of Gauker's challenge? Are we able to analyse Tommy and Suzy's dialogue in such a way that we can understand how their conflict is resolved? Let us repeat the dialogue here for ease of reference: The answer is that in order to understand Tommy's last utterance, we have to assume that interlocutors, stubborn though they may be, can sometimes transcend their private interpretations. When the evidence mounts against the presumption that both interlocutors use the same interpretation, they may become aware that the interpretive mode of the other is crucially different from their own. This may happen immediately after the controversial statement has been uttered. For example, Tommy's initial All of the red marbles are mine might have prompted Suzy to realize that Tommy is referring to some other domain of discourse than she, or perhaps to a different type of ownership. Why else is he saying something that is so clearly wrong? In the extended version of Gauker's example, the interlocutors take more time for the resolution of their conflict. Initially, they think they have a real (i.e., non-verbal) conflict, but after a couple of utterances back and forth, this position becomes less and less likely. The only alternative to assuming a difference of interpretive modes would be for them to accept that they have differences of opinion over -Who owns a certain set of marbles, -Which of the parents gave these marbles to one of the kids, and so on. As the evidence mounts, it becomes increasingly likely that one of them realizes that it is simpler to assume that they are talking about different sets of marbles than to assume that they have a genuine difference of opinion over all these different facts.
Competent speakers of a language know that the meaning of an utterance, for a given interlocutor, depends on the meaning of the constituents of the utterance for the same utterance, as was argued in section 2. But they also know that different interlocutors may have different interpretations in mind for a given utterance. In other words: competent speakers of the language know that the principle of idiosyncratic interpretation holds. This type of continuation seems to lend some modest support, of an empirical kind, to the expressive theory. After all, the hearer (i.e., Suzy) is finally brought over to the speaker's (i.e., Tommy's) viewpoint vis-à-vis his initial utterance. In the end, it is the proposition the speaker intended to convey (that is, m t (T)) that is discussed, while the proposition the hearer took him to express (that is, m s (T)) is obsolete. This is precisely what one would expect on the basis of the expressive theory with its emphasis on speaker interpretation, and this illustrates why the expressive theory is intuitively so appealing.
Be this as it may, I hope to have shown that Gauker's T&S example is not problematic for the expressive theory. To do this, we have followed a 'constructive' approach, sketching how the example may be accounted for in terms of a framework in which the expressive theory lies embedded. The basis of this framework might be viewed as a modern version of the medieval doctrine of double truth-but a philosophically innocuous one without unpleasant 'Averroistic' implications (cf. MacClintock 1967). With hindsight, it seems that the issue of truth ('Is Tommy's/Suzy's utterance true?'), on which Gauker has focused his discussion, is largely irrelevant to the correctness of the expressive theory. There are basically two ways of looking upon such words as 'true' and 'false': as words in ordinary language or as technical terms. In the first case, discovering their meaning is a purely empirical affair, to be resolved by corpus research or dictionary lookup, for example. In the second case, the theorist (i.e., the semanticist) is free to define them in any way that he or she likes. Either way, it is hard to see why the definitions of truth and falsity should depend on any particular theory of communication.
Let us sum up. The role of context in the interpretation of utterances has rightly attracted much attention from linguists, philosophers, and researchers in artificial intelligence, especially in recent years. Gauker has highlighted some interesting problems in this area and tried to use these to attack a view of human communication that is both intuitively plausible and very generally adhered to. By doing this, he set himself a difficult task: a too difficult one, one is inclined to say. For if Gauker's "Domains of Discourse" has taught us one thing then it is the resilience of the expressive theory of communication.
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